# **EU climate policy**

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#### **EU** action

- Climate change is happening
- Urgent action is required to limit it to a manageable level
- Aim: Limiting Global Climate Change to 2°C
- Benefits far outweigh the economic costs
- Objective of 30 % reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by developed countries by 2020 (compared to 1990 levels)
- Unilateral target of- 20%
- Rate of growth of developing country emissions should start to fall
- Overall absolute reduction by developing countries from 2020


#### **EU** action II

- By 2050 global emissions must be reduced by up to 50%
  - Reductions in developed countries of 60 80%
- EU ETS as the pillar of the future global carbon market
- EU ETS continues to be open after 2012 to carbon credits from the CDM
- Improvement of EU energy efficiency by 20% by 2020
- Share of renewable energy at 20% by 2020
- Large-scale CCS demonstration plants by 2015


#### **EU** action on ETS

- National allocation plans were slashed considerably
  - Germany as country of the presidency was asked to reduce by 15 million t p.a.
  - Some accession countries had to slash by 50%!
- CER import caps were tightened
  - Formula for "supplementarity" developed by Commission
  - Purchase programmes of governments had an impact on import cap

#### **EU ETS allocation**




## Caps proposed in NAPs




## The Commission response

- Any cap up to 10% will be accepted
- Formula to justify cap >10%
  - Calculate difference between the highest emission level reached either in base year, 2004 or projected for 2010 and the Kyoto budget
  - Calculate 50 % of that difference and then deduct annual average substantiated government purchase of CERs/ERUs
  - Divide by average annual ETS allocation


### The Commission decision



## Possible CER import volumes



## Government acquisition programmes



## Are the caps relevant?

- The CER caps are not binding as they are much higher than the shortage of EU allowances
- The government acquisition programmes fall much short of the needs to close the Kyoto gap
- The Commission formula set a perverse incentive to reduce budgets for government CER acquisition
  - Any higher budget led to a crowding out of private inflow due to reduction of the cap
- Governments may hope for CER windfall due to private imports
  - But later reductions will become more difficult due to the higher amount of banked EU allowances